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In 2000 the Dutch Supreme Court (the ‘High 
Council of the Netherlands’) gave a verdict 
that became known as the ‘Asbestos-arrest’1. It 
dealt with the case of an employee, Van Hese, 
against his employer, the ship building company 
De Schelde NV. Van Hese had worked with the 
company from 1959 to 1963 as a painter and had 
been subjected to asbestos dust due to his work. 
More than thirty years after he had worked with 
the company, in 1996, he was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma. Unfortunately, if a victim of as-
bestos dies beyond the limit of thirty years after 
he got infected, the case is no longer judicially 
valid in Dutch law2. The employee charged his 
former employer nevertheless, in October of 
1996. When he died in November, the heirs took 
De Schelde to court with the principal case being 
whether an employer can still be held responsible 
for an asbestos-caused disease after thirty years. 
The High Court judged that in the case of asbes-
tos, and the cancer it may produce decades after 
the infection, reasonability and judiciousness3 
require that the law should not be dealt with in 
strict terms, but rather in terms of the individual 
case. Therefore, the term of thirty years should 
be expanded4. The verdict made it possible for 
thousands of employees to either charge their 
former employer or to claim insurance money 
because of the disease they had developed more 
than thirty years later due to labor circumstances. 
So, justice was served, or was it?
In what follows the problem we want to deal 
with concerns not the speciic issue of the vast 
industrial use of asbestos and the many victims it 
has caused globally. The problem is suficiently 
documented in studies by, for instance, Jock 
McCulloch and Geoffrey Tweedale or Emmanuel 
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Henry5. Instead of following a sociological 
approach, we want to focus on a speciic interstice 
between the cultural (speciically literary) and 
juridical domain, that is in turn intrinsically 
related to the economical, sociological and po-
litical domain. With respect to this, the asbestos 
issue provoked us to pose the question whether 
there is not a principal or intrinsic inequality in 
play, here, in a confrontation between two radi-
cally different forms of legal personhood. The 
latter term, ‘legal personhood’, is played out 
on the interstice between the cultural (literary) 
domain and the juridical, and concerns the ques-
tion of how a icta persona can become a socio-
political and economical entity, in real life. Yet, 
as the asbestos case proves, there appear to be 
two forms of legal personhood in play that relate 
differently to different material bodies. One is 
alive and vulnerable in terms of death and disease, 
the other only seemingly alive, and invulnerable 
in terms of death and disease. One is individual 
and personal in terms of accountability, the other 
is a ‘company’, which is not accountable in terms 
of personal liability. One is deined in terms of 
lineage by biological connections, the other is de-
ined in terms of lineage by economical connec-
tions. Of one the labor power is bought whereas 
body and personhood are not for sale, the other 
buys labor power and its corporate body can be 
bought or sold. One is human, the other is not. 
The principal inequality between the two, and 
the uncanny characteristic of this inequality, are 
captured in the socio-cultural domain in such a 
way that the issue is both addressed as proble-
matic and made acceptable. This has happened, 
we want to argue, through the igure of Dracula. 
Historically and structurally the literary igure, or 
the icta persona of Dracula coincides, tellingly 
and uncanningly, with the idea and actualiza-
tion of legal corporate personhood. It does so, 
moreover, in relation to two different juridical 
systems, the continental one and the Anglo-
Saxon one (much more inluenced by common 
law). Our question is irst how we can read this 
historical and structural coincidence, that bridges 
different juridical and socio-cultural systems on 
the basis of a similar socio-economic entity – a 
legal icta persona in the sense of corporate 
personhood –  and a powerful cultural icon –  a 
literary icta persona that, since it was called into 
being, became massively popular in the course 
of little more than a century. The question of 
how to read this coincidence, however, is only a 
stepping stone towards the question of what this 
may imply in terms of the juridical conceptua-
lization of corporate personhood in the current 
circumstances. With respect to this issue we want 
to avoid any confusion beforehand about what is 
at stake. What is at stake is not a consideration of 
this persona icta as a moral person. This has been 
considered adequately by Sheryl N. Hamilton in 
Impersonations: Troubling the Person in Law 
and Culture6. What is at stake, in our reading, is 
whether this icta persona is (in)human. 
It is safe to say that the history of the relation 
between asbestos, the diseases it may cause, 
the cover-up of dangers and casualties by those 
responsible, and the possibilities of litigants 
to take the latter to court is by now a long and 
painful one. Despite its well-documented history, 
however, or despite its being a ‘public problem’ as 
Emannuele Henry has called it7, the issue remains 
far from solved. We want to explore whether 
this may be so because of a principal, radical 
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imbalance in the system of law. We want to deal 
with this in an argument that unfolds in three 
steps. First we deal with the Supreme Court’s 
‘Asbestos-arrest’ in more detail, not for the sake 
of addressing the asbestos issue per se but for 
the sake of delineating the imbalance at stake 
through the aspect of a icta persona’s ability 
to live on endlessly, as if in a state of un-death. 
Secondly we go into the historical development 
of corporate personhood, to deal, thirdly, with 
Dracula as a igure for corporate personhood. 
Finally, and briely, we will deal with the impli-
cations of radical differences in personhood for 
the juridical system.
Buying off death: corporate liability and 
invulnerability
When Lawrence Garinkel gives a reconstruction 
of the knowledge available about the dangers 
of asbestos since the twenties of the previous 
century it is puzzling, stunning, or repulsive to 
see how long companies and corporations kept 
working with the material nonetheless – and 
keep on doing so8. Garinkel gives an extensive 
list of studies that appeared since the 1920s 
on the proven relation between asbestos and 
different diseases such as ‘asbestosis’, mesothe-
lioma and cancer. So, those who were responsible 
for (manifold forms of) work with asbestos knew, 
or could have known, that there were conside-
rable health risks involved for all their employees. 
This leaves us, however, with the dificult issue of 
concrete liability in individual cases, especially 
when people have been working for different 
companies, have been smokers meanwhile, etc.
Companies and corporations working with 
asbestos were brought to court from the 1930s. 
Since the 1970s, however, the number of cases 
exploded9. In the United States alone, by 2005, as 
Lester Brickman noted “over 50.000.000 claims 
had been brought forward against 8400 former 
producers, distributors, installers and sellers of 
asbestos-containing products. To date, 850.000 
claimants have sought compensation, costing 
businesses and insurance companies over 70 
billion dollars,” resulting in many bankruptcies10. 
According to Brickman, this number of 850.000 
claimants in 2005, which would account for ifty 
to sixty million claims, was expected to double 
in the following decade. It did. The explanation 
for this massive increase in cases, according to 
Brickman, is that the tracing by complain mana-
gement companies of individual litigants had 
become a form of industry itself. 
Michael Wills, Labour member of the British 
Parliament and Minister of State for the Ministry 
of Justice, addressed the issue in a debate on the 
5th of February 2010 in which he emphasized the 
vulnerability of people who are already ill when 
approached by a claim management company11. 
The irony of course is that they were equally 
vulnerable when getting the disease in their work-
ing for other companies or corporations. Another 
irony is that it is almost impossible for individual 
victims to have the knowledge and expertise to 
operate in this complex ield. Individual litigants 
need if not claim management companies than 
law irms. A third irony may be that if they do 
not need them, they are found by them12. A fourth 
irony, inally, is that they can only be diagnosed 
because of yet another industry, the medical. 
This all may seem close to the cliché of the small 
individual person who is chanceless when he is 
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up against corporate powers. Yet that cliché has 
proven to be awkwardly true in many asbestos 
cases. Even if many individual litigants won their 
case against companies or corporations, they 
did so serving the needs of other companies or 
corporations. 
Still, the Dutch Asbestos-arrest was important 
in terms of jurisdiction and seemed to serve 
individual rights with their demand of “taking 
into consideration all the circumstances of the 
concrete case”13. The Supreme Court then pro-
ceeded to deine what the verdict of a judge in 
future comparable cases should contain. The irst 
requirement was that it should concern inancial 
restitution of damage in terms of wealth, a resti-
tution that should beneit either the victim itself, 
his heirs or third parties. The second requirement 
was that there should not be some other form of 
restitution in play given for a comparable reason. 
The third, fourth and ifth requirement are more 
important for our argument, however. The third 
concerns “the measure in which that what hap-
pened can be blamed on the one spoken to”. The 
latter is a literal translation of original Dutch 
term: “aangesprokene” (which would normally 
be translated with “addressed”). The term is 
derived from the verb “aanspreken”: “to speak 
to”, “to address”, but also “to question someone 
in terms of his behavior”, or “to arrest”. Some 
entity is being spoken to, then, and it is stopped 
in terms of a reproach. This relates to the fourth 
requirement which demands that judges esti-
mate “in what measure the one spoken to has 
considered or should have considered before the 
expiry date came into effect the possibility that 
he would be held responsible for the damage”. 
Then, ifthly, the judges should estimate “whether 
the one spoken to still, in all reasonability, has 
the possibility to defend himself against the ac-
cusation”. The sixth requirement is that a judge 
should estimate whether the liability is covered 
by insurance. Finally the Supreme Court turns 
back to the victim, asking that judges estimate 
whether the accusation is brought forward within 
a reasonable time limit. 
The entity of the one addressed, arrested, 
and charged, here, is deined in a particularly 
anthropocentric way, as if it concerns a human 
entity. Still, the one addressed in this case was a 
company: De Schelde. How could that company 
be able to act as a human individual, in taking the 
blame, in considering something, in defending 
itself? To be sure, such corporate actions have be-
come quasi-natural by now, as if the corporation 
is “naturally” a juridical and somehow human 
person. Yet its in-human quality becomes evident 
when we consider the fact that it need not, and 
in fact did not remain constant over time. Origi-
nally installed in 1875 as the NV Koninklijke 
Maatschappij De Schelde (KMS), it fused with 
the Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij and 
the NV Motorenfabriek Thomassen in de Steeg 
in 1965. This resulted in 1966 in the Rijn-Schelde 
Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV, which 
was in turn fused with the Verolme Verenigde 
Scheepswerven NV in 1971, leading to the so-
called Rijn-Schelde-Verolme Machinefabrieken 
en Scheepswerven NV (RSV). This company 
went bankrupt in 1983, was dismantled by the 
state and the province, who sold their shares 
in 2000 to the Damen Shipyards Group under 
the umbrella of which the Koninklijke Schelde 
Groep BV (KSG) became one of the working 
units, under the name of which it had already 
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been operative since 199114. 
Apparently corporations are capable of changing 
body, face or name. They may live on whereas 
they seemed to have disappeared, and can resur-
rect from what seemed to be a death. This is why 
lawyers have become more and more concerned 
with issues of responsibility and liability in rela-
tion to corporate personhood. And in order to 
avoid liability being fended off by the corporate 
mask, lawyers have looked, for instance, for ways 
of “piercing the corporate veil” as it is called, 
taking the shareholders to court15. Still, in 1991 
Robert B, Thompson wrote: “Piercing the corpo-
rate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate 
law and yet it remains among the least under-
stood.”16 He was not the irst one to state this 
since Benjamin Cardozo had already described 
this so-called “corner of the law as ‘enveloped in 
the mists of metaphor’”17. We think these mists 
relate intrinsically to the constitution of corporate 
personhood, as long as it metaphorically relates 
to not so much a human person, but a human.
Artiicial, ictive and real – corporation as a 
separate entity
While theoretical  contributions to the 
contemporary debate over corporate personhood 
have been wide-ranging, they nevertheless tend to 
unfold in three schematic steps18. First, the attempt 
is made to determine which characteristics of 
human beings are responsible for their status 
as paradigmatic legal persons. Second, these 
characteristics are examined in isolation in 
order to determine whether or not non-human 
entities, and in particular corporations, may be 
said to exhibit analogous qualities. Third, this 
verdict then determines whether the label of 
corporate person should be considered a real 
“identiication on the level of substance”19 or 
rather merely metaphorical, a legal iction. In 
addition to what might be called the “real” and 
“artiicial” entity theories, two other possibilities 
exist: the corporate person can be seen as a sort 
of legal shorthand through which the rights of 
individuals can still be read (the so-called “nexus 
of contracts” or “partnership” theory), or else the 
notion of corporate personhood can be denied 
entirely. For reasons that will become apparent 
below, we do not consider either of these last two 
options plausible.
Admitting the incommensurability of the human 
and the corporation, we insist that the latter is a 
real agent, possessing its own objectives, desires 
and drives. Yet these desires are fundamentally 
non-human, if not, indeed, inhuman. Therefore, 
a distinction must be made between the human 
and the person. Or, we believe that the designa-
tion “person” is not so much anthropomorphic, 
but that the debate surrounding corporate person-
hood has remained too anthropocentric. Arthur 
W. Machen’s famous deinition of the corpora-
tion is telling, here: “A corporation is a ictitious, 
artiicial person, composed of natural persons, 
created by the State, existing in contemplation 
of law, invisible, soulless, immortal.”20 Although 
the quote is clearly ambiguous, it is paradigmatic 
for the refusal to consider a world populated by 
“persons” who interact with human beings but do 
not resemble them in the sense of being human.
The problem posed to legal thought by the rise 
of the modern business corporation was pre-
cisely that the latter did not it comfortably into 
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a juridical system designed to mediate between 
(human) individuals and between individuals and 
governments21. While the corporation had existed 
since Roman times, medieval and early modern 
corporations were not yet commercial organiza-
tions but rather quasi-public entities such as 
cities, universities, and ecclesiastical bodies; 
receiving their charter from the king (or, later, by 
act of parliament), they were thus viewed as cre-
ations, if not extensions, of the state22. Meanwhile 
trading companies, which began to proliferate 
from the sixteenth century onwards, were initially 
organized as a variant of legal partnership and as 
such possessed neither personhood nor perpetual 
succession; as forms of private enterprise they 
would dissolve upon the death of any partner and 
could only be re-formed after paying out a share 
of assets to the heirs of the deceased23. There thus 
existed a clear distinction between the corpora-
tion as a creature of the state and the business 
partnership as an extension of the individual. Like 
the state, the corporation was comprised of many 
members but irreducible to any one of them. It 
was, at least potentially, immortal. In contrast, the 
business partnership was as mortal as its partners, 
and indeed died with them. 
This distinction began to unravel in the early 
seventeenth century with the emergence of 
chartered trading companies, the irst of which 
were the East India Company, founded in 1600, 
and the Dutch East India Company, founded in 
1602. Despite state-granted monopoly privileges, 
and although acting in some sense as sovereign 
powers, such chartered companies initially 
operated much like uncharted partnerships, divi-
ding assets among investors at the end of every 
voyage24. But in 1623 the Dutch Estates General 
granted the Dutch East India Company perpetual 
existence, with England quickly following suit. 
Shareholders could no longer withdraw from the 
company at will but were compensated by a new 
right to sell their shares, resulting in the “joint-
stock company.”25 
Theoretically and practically, the joint-stock 
company represented a tremendous shift, combi-
ning elements of private enterprise with the rights 
and privileges of state incorporation, including 
the right to sue and to be sued in the corporate 
name, the ability to purchase land and, perhaps 
most signiicantly, perpetual succession26. As, 
simultaneously, a private commercial venture and 
a state-sanctioned entity of at least notional public 
interest, the status of the chartered company was 
radically ambiguous: to whom was it ultimately 
accountable? While this ambiguity implicitly 
threatened the very foundations of common law, 
it did not yet become a full-blown legal problem, 
primarily because the king and parliament jeal-
ously guarded their powers of incorporation, 
issuing charters only rarely. The vast majority of 
British companies remained unchartered and con-
tinued to be treated as a form of legal partnership 
well into the nineteenth century27. As a result, the 
full legal problem of corporate personhood would 
irst emerge, not in England or on the continent, 
but in the newly-liberated American colonies. 
While the joint-stock company was familiar to the 
American colonies, many of which had, after all, 
been established by corporate bodies28, the cor-
poration was a relatively rare legal form in early 
America29. At the time of independence, most 
enterprise was still in the hands of individuals, 
families, or in legal partnerships30, while corpo-
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rate status was generally reserved for business 
activities perceived to be in the public interest: 
banks and insurance companies, large-scale 
building projects, waterworks, etc. Following 
the well-established precedent of common law, 
the corporation was still thought of as a state-
sponsored entity, one which “owed its existence 
more to government than to its corporators and, 
as a creature of positive law, had only the rights 
and privileges that obtained from the govern-
ment’s grant.”31 
This situation began to alter in the years fol-
lowing independence, when the powers of 
incorporation passed from the British sovereign 
to the individual American states, which issued 
charters with greater alacrity than had the King 
or Parliament32. Meanwhile priority was shift-
ing from an elite class of landowners to a new 
manufacturing-based elite, which quickly dis-
covered that incorporation, with its tremendous 
lexibility and limited liability, was more suited to 
its economic interests than were narrower forms 
of legal partnership. The relative ease of incor-
poration, combined with transformations in the 
burgeoning capitalist economy, led to an explo-
sion of chartered corporations, particularly after 
states began to pass general incorporation statutes 
from the early nineteenth century on. Motivated 
by a populist, Jacksonian suspicion of the special 
privileges extended in corporate charters, such 
statutes, which essentially made incorporation 
available to anyone, for any purpose, ironically 
increased the number and extent of business cor-
porations to unprecedented proportions33.
Faced with this dramatically altered social, 
political and economic landscape, American 
jurisprudence began to revise its conception of 
the corporate person. The proliferation of pri-
vate corporations with no demonstrable public 
purpose undermined the notion of incorporation 
as a privilege granted by the state, while busi-
nessmen began to chafe at the notion that such a 
“privilege” could be amended, or even rescinded, 
by legislative whim. Instead, they began to argue 
that corporations were essentially contractual. 
They were engendered not by the state, but by 
the corporators and investors who came together 
to form them34. On this view, the notion that the 
state could regulate, restrict or otherwise dictate 
the pursuits of chartered entities appeared as an 
undue restriction on the pursuits of the private 
individuals; or, as one bar attorney had it, “the 
rights and duties of an incorporated association 
are in reality the rights and duties of the persons 
who compose it.”35  
This view met with some sympathy in the courts, 
which were struggling to make sense of an entity 
which had quite obviously escaped the conines 
of government legislation. Thus, in the well-
known Railroad Tax Cases of 1886, the circuit 
court ruled that corporate property could not be 
taxed differently than individual property, for 
“to deprive the corporation of its property, or to 
burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators 
of their property or to lessen its value.”36 Where 
common law had considered the corporate person 
a metaphysical being distinct from its individual 
incorporators, the court now argued that this 
“person” was a mere contrivance, or legal ic-
tion, through and beyond which the igures of 
real persons could be discerned: “The courts will 
look through the ideal entity and name of the 
corporation to the persons who compose it, and 
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protect them, though the process be in its name”37.
In so ruling, the court was falling back on the sole 
alternative available from within a framework 
which contraposed state and individual as the 
dual categories of legal thought. If the corpora-
tion could no longer plausibly be claimed as the 
creation of the one, perhaps it could simply be 
regarded as an extension of the other. Yet this 
proposition was no sooner formulated than it 
created additional problems, already discernible 
in the case of the railroads themselves, which, 
inanced by selling equity and debt security to 
thousands of small investors, could not plausibly 
claim to operate as a mere aggregate of their 
shareholders. Indeed, the ability to maintain 
operational continuity despite changes among 
oficers and shareholders was one of the distin-
guishing features of the corporate form. Further, 
in rendering the corporation no more than the 
sum of its corporators, this framework threatened 
to destroy the distinction between incorporation 
and legal partnership – along with the beneits, 
such as limited liability and perpetual succession, 
which this distinction had maintained. In the face 
of this, the law was forced to conclude that the 
corporate person must, after all, possess some 
agency independent of the will of its corporators. 
As the English legal theorist Frederic William 
Maitland summed it up succinctly: “If n men unite 
themselves in an organized body, jurisprudence, 
unless it wishes to pulverize the group, must seen 
n + 1 persons.”38
The wild swings in the conceptualization of 
the corporate person in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century indicate a profound crisis of 
legal thought. Beginning as an artiicial entity 
dependent on the state, the corporate person was 
subsequently read as a synecdoche of its human 
corporators, only to return into itself as an inde-
pendent entity, but freed now from the shackles 
of the state. But if the corporation was an entity 
neither dependent on the state nor reducible to its 
corporators, what was it? Or how do we envision 
a “person” who is not essentially human? 
Dracula, or inhuman personhood
The profound error of nineteenth-century 
jurisprudence was not, pace some theorists, 
to have granted the corporation the status of 
“person,” but rather to have failed to adequately 
conceptualize the non- or in-human nature 
of this person. The late nineteenth-century 
corporation was indisputably an entity in its own 
right, possessive of self-agency and pursuing 
interests which could no longer be traced either 
to the behest of the state or to the will of its 
human corporators. But if, like these latter, 
the corporation was in some sense a creative, 
autonomous, self-directed agent, it differed from 
them in signiicant ways. The corporation, for 
example, unlike its corporators, did not possess 
bioligical life, yet in some sense could live 
forever39. It appeared in no place at all, or else in 
many places at once. Invisible, intangible, and 
at least potentially immortal, it would appear 
that we are dealing with an unprecedented legal 
entity. If there is no legal precedent, however, 
there is a literary one. Examing this queer nexus 
of qualities, of a “person” who is not human, 
who is distinctly not alive and yet in some sense 
“lives” forever, we argue that the igure which 
most closely resembles the legal conception of 
corporate personhood is, in fact, the vampire. We 
agree, here, with an analysis put forward by Gail 
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Turley in “Bankerization panic and the corporate 
personality in Dracula”40.
While the metaphoric entwinement of capitalism 
and vampirism dates back at least as far as Marx 
(“capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, 
lives only off living labor”) we believe it is not 
“capital” which should be termed vampiric, 
but individual capitals, or corporate persons. 
For the corporation, like the vampire, “lives 
off” the lives of a number of individual human 
personalities without whom it could not function 
or exist. Yet the corporation is distinct from the 
persons who constitute or “feed” it, possessing a 
discrete personality which is neither necessarily 
represented by nor embodied in its corporators. 
While the corporation relies on the continuance of 
human life in toto, the individual lives and deaths 
of its corporators (its “hosts”) are immaterial. 
Moreover, theoretical debate about corporate 
personhood has centered around questions of 
intentionality that are the precise questions one 
might ask about the vampire: can it be said to 
have a “soul”, a “will” or a “mind” analogous 
to that of the human individual; can it be said 
to possess moral agency; can it be said to hold 
the fundamental right to pursue happiness; does 
it have an emotional, let alone a spiritual life41? 
From a diachronic perspective, the rise of the 
vampire in the ield of literature and of the busi-
ness corporation in the ield of law, share a starkly 
similar historic trajectory. Both were relatively 
rare (literary and economic) forms before the 
industrial era, and both rose gradually to promi-
nence across the nineteenth century. By the early 
twentieth century, they both possessed enormous 
(real or cultural) currency. In other words, the 
nineteenth-century vampire novel cannot be 
disassociated from the cultural and economic 
conditions of its production, any more than the 
business corporation can be detached from these 
literary after-images. In this regard, the historical 
development of corporate personhood across the 
19th century can best be understood, as was noted 
by Turley, against the emblematic vampire story 
of that era: Bram Stoker’s 1897 novel, Dracula. 
Debate has raged, in economically-oriented 
analyses of Stoker’s Dracula, about whether the 
Count represents an anachronistic land-based and 
serf-based feudalism surviving long past its time; 
hence the metaphoric vampirism. Or is Dracula, 
in point of fact, the emblematic “new face” of 
capitalism? David Seed, for example, states 
conidently that Dracula “represents a reversion 
to a feudal aristocracy that imperiously claims 
allegiance regardless of checks and balances”42, 
whilst Franco Moretti is equally conident that 
“like capital, Dracula is impelled towards a 
continuous growth, an unlimited expansion of 
his domain.”43 Both of these contradictory 
analyses contain an element of truth. At a his-
torical moment of both industrial and economic 
revolution, Dracula represents the transition of a 
landowning upper class towards a landless, state-
less, “disembodied” capitalism, one which must 
however search for new legal forms in order to 
carry out this transition.
With respect to this it is telling that Dracula is, 
in several ways, a curiously legal document. 
Indeed, Jonathan Harker, the irst of the novel’s 
(many) protagonists to encounter the vampire, 
travels to Dracula’s remote castle in answer to 
a request for legal counsel. Signiicantly, the 
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issue at hand involves a real estate transaction: 
Dracula wishes to purchase property in Britain, 
and lacks the knowledge and ability to complete 
the transaction himself. He reveals that while 
previously he has known England only through 
books, he now looks to Harker to provide him 
with knowledge of the culture and the language 
suficient for him to “pass” as an Englishman:
“Well I know that, did I move and speak in your 
London, none there are who would not know me 
for a stranger. That is not enough for me. (…) I 
have been so long master that I would be master 
still.”44 
Dracula’s need for real estate advice is thus 
merely a preliminary; what he truly needs Harker 
to provide is a mastery of the language, idioms 
and customs of his culture, one that will allow 
him to pass for an English person – or can we say, 
a “person” tout court, one that remains master, 
however? The peasants of Dracula’s native envi-
rons know him for what he is. It is only through 
the mediation of Harker as foreign (legal) body 
that Dracula can hope to “pass” not just as a 
British person but as a human one.
Accordingly, Harker initially treats the count 
as a human client, precisely because he cannot 
conceive of him otherwise. He possesses no other 
conceptual category within which to make sense 
of this peculiar igure. In many ways, Harker’s 
initial failure is a failure of the legal imagination. 
Or, the creation of a legal category of corporate 
personality mimicked the move made by Harker. 
Faced with a fundamentally new entity for which 
no (legal) conceptual frame existed, the law tried 
to resolve the discrepancy by placing the corpo-
ration within the category which it most closely 
resembled. The corporation acts like a human 
individual in some ways, just as in some ways 
Dracula does, indeed, resemble a “model” human 
being. Thus an attempt was made, overlooking 
apparent discrepancies, to “it” the corporate 
“person” into a preexisting human category.
The subsequent unfolding of the narrative can be 
read, in part, as an attempt to overcome this initial 
error, as Harker and the novel’s other protagonists 
come to realize the consequences of having 
treated Dracula anthropomorphically. These 
consequences are, initially, legal and economic: 
Dracula takes his enormous pile of gold (petriied 
capital) and invests in a number of real estate 
purchases, aided of course by Harker’s business 
acumen. Only after having so established himself 
is he able to go about his real business: extracting 
human blood, not out of pleasure but, as it were, 
out of economic necessity. As Moretti notes, 
Dracula is compelled to pursue fresh victims, 
just as capital is compelled to accumulate45. Only 
now do the novel’s protagonists begin to realize 
that this being is not a “person” like others; his 
essence if of a different sort than the human, 
indeed is parasitic upon the human. However, 
this realization is not straightforward, and in fact 
requires something like a verdict. They begin 
to record their encounters and experiences and 
then to circulate these as a form of evidence, or 
testimony. Only after having examined the facts 
of the case can they arrive at a conclusion, assign 
a name to this strange creature, and take action 
to deal with him.
Read as an allegorical (dis)embodiment of 
corporate personhood, the lesson of Stoker’s 
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Dracula is that the corporate person cannot 
be adequately dealt with until the nature of 
its in-human nature of personhood has been 
conceptualized. Like the vampire, the corporate 
person possesses neither soul, nor body, nor 
biological life, yet these distinctions were 
not fully addressed by nineteenth-century 
jurisprudence, which proved less capable than 
Dracula’s protagonists in this regard. This is 
what allowed these latter to pursue the vampire, 
to coniscate his resources and, ultimately, to 
kill him.
It would be a mistake to take this defeat too 
literally, as the allegorically possible death of the 
corporate person. After all, capital continued to 
live on in England after Dracula’s demise, and it 
is not clear how, or if, one can kill a corporate 
person. Instead, we argue, the vampire’s defeat 
represents the symbolic victory of a contractual 
conception of corporate personhood over the 
“real entity” theory. It is no coincidence, then, as 
Moretti notes, that the novel’s cast of characters 
represent “all the different interests and cultural 
paradigms of the dominant class (law, commerce, 
the land, science)”46, for these bulwarks of the 
traditional elite are symbolically conjured and 
then united in their opposition to the new menace. 
But whereas Moretti reads this symbolic grouping 
as representative of the collective powers of 
nationalism (ignoring the vital inclusion of a 
Dutch and an American character), we propose 
that they can be read as embodying a rival 
conception of the corporate entity as contractual: 
as a free association of individuals engaged in 
a mutually beniicial entreprise, through and 
beyond which their individual visages can still 
be traced.
Read metaphorically Dracula on the one hand 
harks back to an anachronistic, conception of 
corporate identity in which the individual’s 
will supersedes that of the inhuman, totalizing 
corporate form. Such a retrograde conception, 
however, yearns to reverse both the industrial and 
legal revolutions of the 19th century and the new 
economic and political forms to which they gave 
birth. The truly “fantastic” element of Dracula 
does not reside in the fact that the vampire, in the 
novel, is ultimately vanquished, but that, in real-
ity, we granted him immortal citizenship, in the 
shape of inhuman corporate personhood.
Human-inhuman: restructuring the juridical 
system
With the conceptual creation of the corporate 
entity as distinct from any corporators – whether 
individually or as some metaphoric whole – came 
a drastic shift in the way corporations would be 
treated by the law. By now, the corporation is, 
in any sense, a “real” rather than a metaphoric 
person. It is itself an “autonomous, creative, 
self-directed”47 being, striving to persist and de-
velop its capabilities. Accordingly it has gained 
access to a plethora of legal and particularly 
human rights to which it had never before been 
presumed to have access, such as the right against 
self-incrimination and, in the USA, the right to 
lobby the government. With respect to this, the 
“word proved the perfect rhetorical weapon, 
asserting the panoply of individualist protec-
tions for the corporation and shifting the role of 
the state from guardian to invader of rights.”48 
The fundamental and principal inequality this 
produces between the soulless, immortal body 
of the corporation and the vulnerable bodies of 
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human beings has become amply evident. It can 
be solved, we suggest, by moving away from an 
anthropocentric analysis of corporations, just as 
one would want to avoid dealing with Dracula as 
a real human being. Yet if we succeed in no longer 
thinking of corporations as “human”, this must 
imply that we have to restructure the juridical 
system in terms of human and inhuman realms 
that answer to different regimes of justice. This 
is, at least, the radical option we need to think 
through in current circumstances.
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Partant d’un arrêt de la Cour Suprême des Pays-Bas 
qui fait suite à une plainte introduite par un ouvrier de 
l’amiante, ce texte interroge le déséquilibre originel 
qui sous-tend toute relation entre deux personnalités 
radicalement différentes, l’ouvrier et l’entreprise, dont 
la première est dotée d’une identité physique alors que 
la seconde ne l’est pas. Cet article propose d’analyser 
quelques tenants et aboutissants en termes de responsa-
bilité, d’héritage et de subsistance, de cette inégalité qui 
fonde le champ de tension entre l’instance employante 
et celui qu’elle emploie. Plus particulièrement, la igure 
romanesque de Dracula, dont le succès est contem-
porain de l’émergence de l’entreprise commerciale, sert 
ici à problématiser l’étrangeté pourtant culturellement 
assimilée de cette instance hybride qui s’est imposée 
en tant qu’absolue nécessité et monstruosité tout à la 
fois : une combinatoire d’anthropomorphisme et de sa 
plus simple négation. 
Abstract
On the basis of a recent verdict of the Dutch Supreme 
Court known as the “Asbestos-arrest”, this article re-
lects on the original unbalance which underlies every 
relation and conlict between a worker and a corpora-
tion, both embodying two but radically different forms 
of personhood. To question this fundamental inequality 
in terms of accountability, subsistence and identity, 
this text argues that the igure of Dracula, which had 
its irst heyday simultaneously to the emergence of the 
business corporation, captures this inequality in such a 
way that the issue is both addressed as problematic and 
made acceptable, revealing further on a smokescreen 
that hides the real problem: a corporation is non-human 
and thus, contrary to the worker, can’t be killed.
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